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THE ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY IN
PROTECTING (AND IMPAIRING)
SHAREHOLDER INTERESTS: INCENTIVES
AND DISINCENTIVES TO MAXIMIZE
CORPORATE WEALTH
JEFFREY MICHAEL SMITH
“For the rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the
man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics
1
and the master of economics.”

INTRODUCTION
In December 1993, an attorney for James Bird informed the
board of directors of Lida, Inc. that the corporation was involved in
disadvantageous lease agreements with its controlling shareholders.2
As a noncontrolling stockholder of Lida,3 Bird was unhappy with the
lease agreements, which enriched the controlling shareholders at the
expense of the corporation and the other shareholders. Bird presented his information to the board of directors of Lida, and made a
demand for investigation.4 The board subsequently appointed a special committee, which retained independent real estate appraisal
firms.5 Acting on a report from this committee, the board of directors renegotiated the leases in the corporation’s favor.6
The renegotiation of the leases, instigated as a result of Bird’s
demand, will save Lida over $680,000.7 Lida’s shareholders as a

1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
JUSTICE HOLMES 391, 399 (1995). Holmes delivered this address at Boston University on
January 8, 1897. See id. at 391.
2. See Bird v. Lida, Inc., 681 A.2d 399, 401 (Del. Ch. 1996).
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 401-02.
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group will receive a substantial benefit, but James Bird, being only
one of many shareholders, will realize just a small portion of that
benefit. His attorney will receive none of the benefit. It was Bird
and his attorney, however, who bore the costs of investigating the
corporation, discovering the inefficiency, and bringing it to the attention of the board of directors. Bird and his attorney expended resources in a way that created “a substantial quantifiable financial
benefit to the corporation.”8 Nevertheless, under current law, the
people responsible for this increase of wealth are not entitled to
share in it.
There is, however, another side to plaintiffs’ attorneys; they do
not always create wealth. In fact, attorneys often bring meritless derivative suits against corporations just to extort a settlement.9 All too
often, this technique is successful; empirical studies and practical experience have led to a growing consensus among judges and academics that shareholder litigation is open to abuse by plaintiffs and their
attorneys to a greater extent than are other fields of civil litigation.10
Among shareholder suits, derivative suits are the most likely to be
frivolous.11
Plaintiffs’ attorneys are the controlling force in shareholder litigation,12 and like most other actors in the economy, including corporate managers and shareholders, they are often motivated by the
prospect of personal financial gain or loss. There is nothing necessarily wrong with this motivation; indeed, it’s the motivation we have
come to expect, and at times even revere, in our capitalist system.
However, unlike in private sector markets where the “invisible hand”

8. Id. at 403.
9. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
10. See Tim Oliver Brandi, The Strike Suit: A Common Problem of the Derivative Suit and
the Shareholder Class Action, 98 DICK. L. REV. 355, 368 (1994); Reinier Kraakman et al., When
are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 GEO. L.J. 1733, 1736 (1994); see also Ralph
K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting Managers: Raising the
Cost of Capital in America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945, 949 (1993) (noting that a large percentage of
shareholder claims are frivolous and are based on settlement value instead of merit); Roberta
Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 84
(1991) (observing that in most derivative suits, plaintiffs’ attorneys benefit more than their clients, who usually receive only “minimal compensation”).
11. See Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, Matsushita and Beyond: The Role of State
Courts in Class Actions Invoking Exclusive Federal Claims, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 219, 283 n.73
(citing Romano, supra note 10, at 55) (concluding that derivative suits are more likely to be
frivolous than the other type of shareholder litigation, shareholder class actions).
12. See infra notes 118-26 and accompanying text.
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turns individual avarice into societal wealth,13 in the legal system policymakers must take care to craft rules that turn attorneys’ selfinterest into wealth-maximizing behavior. We must create incentives
that reward efficient, wealth-creating activities and deter inefficient,
wealth-destroying activities.
Part I.A of this Note discusses the differing incentives between
managers and shareholders and explains why managers do not always
act in the best interests of the shareholders. Part I.B describes incentives that American law has developed to motivate shareholders and
their attorneys to take action against certain types of inefficient management action.14 Part II discusses the legal debate over the Bird v.
Lida situation, described above, in which the shareholder and his attorney expend resources, make a demand on the corporation, and
create a benefit for the collective shareholders, but do not actually
file suit. Finally, Part III suggests two proposals: the first would give
plaintiffs’ attorneys further incentive to act in wealth-creating ways,
while the second would deter plaintiffs’ attorneys from engaging in
wealth-destroying behavior.
I.

SHAREHOLDER OVERSIGHT OF CORPORATIONS

Although there are many corporations that have only a small
number of shareholders, the nation’s giant corporations, which generally have a large number of shareholders, play a particularly significant role in the economy.15 It is estimated that the nation’s 500 largest corporations control 75% of the United States’ industrial assets
and are responsible for 75% of the country’s new investment.16 Since
such a large percentage of the nation’s assets are controlled by corporations, society has a substantial interest in the efficient operation of
these corporations; society benefits when corporations use these as13. See 1 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 456 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., Oxford
University Press 1976) (1776) (describing how when an individual labors in the ec onomy,
though “he intends only his own gain,” he is “led by an invisible hand” to promote the economic interests of society).
14. While this Note discusses general corporate law common to most American jurisdictions, it focuses on the corporate law of Delaware, “the dominant corporation law state.”
Glenn G. Morris, Shareholder Derivative Suits: Louisiana Law, 56 LA. L. REV. 583, 585 (1996);
see also WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 125 (7th ed. 1995) (noting that Delaware is “the leading jurisdiction for publicly held corporations”).
15. See CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 14, at 243.
16. See MERRITT B. FOX, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN A DYNAMIC
ECONOMY 117 (1987).
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sets in the most efficient manner.17
A. Differing incentives between managers and shareholders
The interests of corporate shareholders are aligned with the interests of society; the corporation that acts efficiently will maximize
the company’s value and thus maximize the value of each shareholder’s stock.18 Shareholders, however, do not run corporations; directors and managers do,19 and their interests do not always coincide
with shareholders’ interests.20 Several factors contribute to this divergence of interest. First, while managers generally own stock in the
firm that they manage,21 they typically own only a small portion of the
company, and as such receive only a small percentage of any wealth
that their decisions create.22 Thus, they may not have sufficient incentive to fully use their intellectual capital and labor in the service
of the firm. Second, managers are often motivated as much, if not
more, by desires for personal power and prestige, as they are by the
goal of profit maximization.23 Third, and perhaps most importantly,

17.

See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
(1991) (“[W]hat is optimal for the [publicly held] firms and investors is
optimal for society.”). The term “efficiency” refers to the use of resources in a way that maximizes their value. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11 (4th ed. 1992).
18. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 30 (1976)
(“[A] shareholder’s objective is that the corporation maximize its per-share earnings.”).
19. See Abrams v. Koether, 766 F. Supp. 237, 249 (D.N.J. 1991) (“Under Delaware law,
the directors of a corporation, not the shareholders, manage the business and affairs of a corporation.”); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (“[T]he business and affairs of a
Delaware corporation are managed by or under its board of directors.”); see also CARY &
EISENBERG, supra note 14, at 242 (“Where shareholdership is highly dispersed [among many
shareholders], the corporation will be controlled not by the shareholders, but by management . . . .”) (discussing ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932)).
20. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 17, at 91. Of course, directors and managers are supposed to subjugate their own interest to the interests of the shareholders. See Cede
& Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993). However, “[m]any decisions [made
by corporate managers] appear to be motivated more by self-interest than by concern for
shareholders or even other constituencies. Other decisions appear to be the result of sheer incompetence or inefficiency.” Carol Goforth, Proxy Reform as a Means of Increasing Shareholder Participation in Corporate Governance: Too Little, But Not Too Late, 43 AM. U. L.
REV. 379, 414 (1994).
21. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate
Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 18 (1986).
22. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 10 (1991).
23. See EISENBERG, supra note 18, at 31.
OF CORPORATE LAW 7
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managers are “overinvested” in a single corporation (the one they
manage) while shareholders are “diversified.”24 Shareholders can,
and almost always do, invest in a cross-section of securities, including
the stocks of numerous corporations.25 This allows them to reduce
their overall risk (the variance of possible returns on their portfolio)
without reducing their expected return.26 This is desirable to them
because people are generally risk averse, preferring a lower variance
in returns to a higher variance.27
Managers, however, cannot diversify their “portfolios” for three
reasons. First, managers typically receive, as part of their compensation, stock and/or stock options that they are not allowed to sell.28
Second, managers are potentially subject to unlimited personal liability in lawsuits based upon their management, while a shareholder’s
liability is limited to his investment in the company.29 Finally, a manager’s most important “asset” is his job, and this is with only one
company.30
This overinvestment causes managers to be primarily concerned
with the performance of their firm. Managers, like other people, are
risk averse;31 thus, they are more concerned with minimizing risk, particularly the risk of bankruptcy, than with profit maximization.32
Shareholders, with their diversified portfolios, do not particularly
care about the performance of a single firm; instead, they care about
the performance of the overall economy and the stock market.33
Shareholders will thus prefer a high risk-high return strategy to a low
risk-low return one, since they are essentially risk-neutral with regard
to each individual firm.34
24.
25.
26.

See Coffee, supra note 21, at 16-20; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 17, at 28-29.
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 17, at 28-30.
See FREDERIC S. MISHKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL
MARKETS 101-04 (2d ed. 1989) (“Diversification is almost always beneficial to the risk-averse
investor since it reduces risk unless returns on securities move perfectly together (which is an
extremely rare occurrence).”).
27. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 17, at 29-30; MISHKIN, supra note 26, at
101.
28. See Coffee, supra note 21, at 18.
29. See id.
30. See id.; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 17, at 17.
31. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 17, at 30.
32. See Coffee, supra note 21, at 19 (“Because the manager cannot spread his risks, or escape them safely in the event of insolvency, he is economically wedded to his firm.”).
33. See id. (“Once a shareholder has diversified his portfolio, he is in theory largely immune from firm-specific risk . . . .”).
34. See id.
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B. Combating the Collective Action Problem: Current Law
The collective shareholders have a financial interest in monitoring management and taking action when managers act dishonestly or
inefficiently. However, monitoring the corporation and taking action
against managers costs money.35 Although the shareholders as a
group will often benefit substantially from such outlays,36 each individual shareholder will get only a small piece of the benefit. This
creates a collective action problem:37 No shareholder has an incentive
to engage in activity that would benefit the collectivity, and bear the
full costs of such activity when the benefits will be scattered among
all of the shareholders.38
One tool crafted to encourage attorneys to alleviate this collective action problem is the derivative suit.39 Derivative suits are used
mainly to sue corporate officers and directors for breaches of the fiduciary duties that managers and directors owe to the corporation.40
When managers or directors have breached their duty to the corporation and its shareholders, a single shareholder can stand derivatively
in the corporation’s shoes and sue the delinquent individuals.41 The
claim continues to be owned by the corporation, but the shareholder
files and manages the lawsuit.42 If the suit is successful, the corporation (thus the collective shareholders), receives the monetary recov-

35. See, e.g., Bird v. Lida, Inc., 681 A.2d 399, 403 (Del. Ch. 1996) (discussing the expenditure of resources which led to a benefit for the corporation).
36. See, e.g., id. at 401-02 (stating that the corporation saved in excess of $680,000 (in 1996
dollars) as a result of a shareholder’s action).
37. See Macey & Miller, supra note 22, at 10.
38. For further discussion of the collective action problem, see MANCUR OLSON, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (2d ed. 1971).
39. The United States Supreme Court has described the derivative suit as the “chief regulator of corporate management.” Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548
(1949). Commentators have noted that a derivative suit can increase corporate value in two
ways: the prospect of a derivative suit may deter misconduct, and the suit itself may yield positive recovery for the corporation even after subtracting all costs that the corporation incurs as a
result of the suit. See Kraakman et al., supra note 10, at 1736.
40. See Morris, supra note 14, at 584. A fiduciary duty is a “duty to act for someone else’s
benefit, while subordinating one’s personal interests to that of the other person. It is the highest standard of duty implied by law.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 625 (6th ed. 1990). Types of
breaches of fiduciary duty include “grossly negligent mismanagement, waste of corporate assets, excessive compensation, usurpation of corporate opportunity, and . . . general selfdealing.” Brandi, supra note 10, at 360.
41. See Morris, supra note 14, at 584.
42. See id.
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ery.43 The shareholder who brings suit, however, is entitled to have
his attorney’s fees paid by the corporation.44 Thus, both the costs and
benefits of the action are shared by the whole group. The derivative
suit solves the collective action problem in some circumstances because a single shareholder and his attorney can recover money for the
collective shareholders (through the corporation), and have their
costs, including the attorney’s fees, offset by that same group of collective shareholders (again, through the corporation). The derivative
suit makes it profitable for shareholders’ attorneys to act against certain types of inefficient activity undertaken by corporate managers.
In Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners,45 the Delaware Supreme
Court expanded the principle behind the derivative suit by awarding
attorney’s fees to Initio Partners, a shareholder-plaintiff who had
sued on its own behalf rather than in the form of a derivative suit.
Initio Partners was the largest single shareholder of Tandycrafts.46
Tandycrafts’ management, apparently fearful of a takeover by Initio
Partners, proposed to its shareholders an amendment to the corporate charter that would have imposed an 80% supermajority voting
requirement for any takeover not approved by the directors.47 Initio
Partners filed suit against Tandycrafts, alleging that the proxy material issued by Tandycrafts’ management was materially misleading.48
Initio Partners alleged, inter alia, that the proxy material was deficient because it failed to mention that Tandycrafts’ management
owned 7.5% of the stock, and the company’s employee benefit plan
owned 10.9%.49 Initio Partners argued that the management’s control
of 18.4% of the stock made the attainment of an 80% supermajority
against the wishes of management virtually impossible.50

43. See id. at 589-90; Mary Elizabeth Matthews, Derivative Suits and the Similarly Situated
Shareholder Requirement, 8 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 1, 1 (1995).
44. See Morris, supra note 14, at 590. If the plaintiff loses, he does not get reimbursed for
his legal fees. This is not generally a problem for the shareholder, however, because these
cases are usually brought on a contingency fee basis. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the
Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law
Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 678 (1986). This means that if
the plaintiff loses the suit, his attorney gets nothing, not even reimbursement for the expenses
of the litigation. See id.
45. 562 A.2d 1162 (Del. 1989).
46. See id. at 1163. Initio Partners owned 9.9% of Tandycrafts’ common stock. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
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While discovery on the suit was proceeding, Tandycrafts issued a
supplement to its proxy statement that included a disclosure of the
combined holdings of the managers and the employee benefit plan.51
Despite the clarifications, Initio Partners maintained its position that
an injunction should be issued barring a shareholder vote on the
amendments.52 Initio Partner’s request was denied, the vote was held,
and the proposal was “soundly defeated.”53 Having achieved its objective, Initio Partners filed a motion to dismiss its lawsuit and an application for attorney’s fees of $180,000 to be assessed against Tandycrafts.54
Tandycrafts argued that a shareholder-plaintiff should not be
allowed to recover attorneys’ fees from the corporation when it sues
for its own benefit and not on behalf of a class or derivatively on behalf of the corporation.55 The Delaware Supreme Court rejected this
argument.56 Noting that attorney fee-shifting is a flexible concept
based on the historic equity power of the Court of Chancery,57 the
court held that, “under certain circumstances, counsel fees may be
awarded to an individual shareholder whose litigation effort confers a
benefit upon the corporation, or its shareholders, notwithstanding the
absence of a class or derivative component,” and awarded the fees.58
The legal principle set forth by the Delaware Supreme Court in
Tandycrafts is significant. The Delaware Supreme Court ruled that
courts should ascertain whether a benefit was conferred upon the
larger shareholder group when determining the propriety of feeshifting.59 In holding that “the critical inquiry is not the status of the
plaintiff but the nature of the corporate or class benefit which is
51. See id. at 1163-64.
52. See id. at 1164.
53. Id.
54. See id.
55. See id. Tandycrafts also argued that there was no causal connection between Initio
Partners’ suit and the supplementary material issued by Tandycrafts. See id. In fact, there
were two causal issues: whether Initio’s suit caused Tandycrafts to issue the supplement, and
whether the issuance of the supplement caused the proposed amendments to fail. For a discussion of causation and where the burden of proof should be placed for an assessment of attorney’s fees, see infra Part III.A.1.
56. See Tandycrafts, 562 A.2d at 1165.
57. See id. at 1166.
58. Id. at 1163. The court set out three requirements that must have been met for a petitioning plaintiff to be awarded attorney’s fees: “(a) the claim was meritorious when filed; (b)
the action was benefiting the corporation; . . . and (c) the benefit was causally related to the
lawsuit.” Id. at 1167.
59. See Tandycrafts, 562 A.2d at 1163.
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causally related to the filing of suit,”60 the court rejected formalism in
favor of spreading the costs of the lawsuit among the shareholders
whom the court found had benefited from the suit. While reaction to
this holding has been mixed,61 the rule set forth in Tandycrafts is
sound. By allowing the shareholder-plaintiff to spread the costs to
those who received the benefit, the court created another tool to deal
with the collective action problem, and it gave shareholders and their
attorneys greater incentive to monitor corporate management and
prevent inefficient behavior.
II. THE NO SUIT-NO FEE RECOVERY DEBATE
As described in Part I.B, Delaware law allows a shareholder to
recover his legal expenses when he and his attorney confer a benefit
on the corporation through a lawsuit. In Bird v. Lida, Inc,62 however,
Bird and his attorney conferred a benefit on the corporation without
filing a lawsuit.63 After acquiring information on the corporation’s
leases, Bird and his attorney made a demand on the corporation.64
Such a demand is required under Delaware law before a derivative
suit can be filed.65 Once Lida received Bird’s demand and the accompanying information, it remedied the problem, creating value for
the corporation.66 Bird and his attorney, however, had personally incurred the costs that led to that gain. Bird filed suit to recover his

60. Id. at 1166.
61. Compare Scott R. Haiber, Note, Derogating the Derivative: Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio
Partners and the Role of Attorneys’ Fees in Shareholder Litigation, 3 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 213,
214 (1990) (contending that “the holding [of Tandycrafts] inadvertently undermines the careful
procedural balance constructed around the derivative suit”), with Recent Case, Attorneys’
Fees—Substantial Benefit Doctrine—Delaware Supreme Court Grants Fees to Plaintiff Suing as
an Individual Shareholder—Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162 (Del. 1989), 103
HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1187-88, 1192 (1990) (arguing that the court’s “decision to force unrepresented shareholders to pay legal fees, although at first surprising, makes sense. The shareholders who benefited from the plaintiff’s efforts should bear a portion of the plaintiff’s expenses in
bringing the suit.”).
62. 681 A.2d 399 (Del. Ch. 1996). For a discussion of the facts of this case, see supra notes
2-8 and accompanying text.
63. See 681 A.2d at 402-05.
64. See id. at 401.
65. See DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1. The demand requirement is strictly enforced by Delaware
courts. See Haber v. Bell, 465 A.2d 353, 357 (Del. Ch. 1983). Most other states have similar
requirements, see Brandi, supra note 10, at 373, as do the federal courts, see FED. R. CIV. P.
23.1.
66. See Lida, 681 A.2d at 401-02.
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costs,67 presenting the issue of whether a shareholder can recover legal expenses incurred when a benefit is conferred on the corporation
but no lawsuit is filed.68
A. Prior Case Law
The issue presented in Lida had been addressed in Foley v. Santa
69
Fe Pacific Corp. In Foley, an Illinois court applied Delaware law in
deciding whether attorneys’ fees could be awarded in the absence of
a suit.70 While it noted that Delaware cases had allowed for recovery
of attorneys’ fees where the underlying lawsuit was settled or rendered moot,71 the court held that, under Delaware law, no recovery
can be granted in a case where no suit has been filed.72 The Foley
court based its decision on Delaware case law; it offered no policy rationale for denying recovery in situations in which no suit was filed.
The Southern District of New York addressed the same issue in
73
Kaufman Malchman & Kirby, P.C. v. Hasbro, Inc. In that case,
Darren Suprina, a shareholder of Hasbro, a Rhode Island Corporation, had demanded, through his attorneys, Kaufman Malchman &
Kirby, P.C. (KMK), that Hasbro stop paying royalties on expired
patents.74 After initial hesitation, Hasbro’s board of directors decided
to substantially comply with Suprina’s request.75 KMK then commenced suit seeking fees for its representation of Suprina.76
The court ruled that where no lawsuit had been filed, a plaintiff
is categorically denied from recovering his expenses under either
Rhode Island or New York law.77 As a matter of law, the court’s

67. See id. at 402.
68. While Bird did eventually file a lawsuit seeking recovery of his costs, the corporate
benefit had already been conferred as a result of his initial demand on the corporation.
69. 641 N.E.2d 992 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
70. See id. at 996.
71. See id. (citing Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162 (Del. 1989); Sugarland Indus., Inc. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142 (Del. 1980)).
72. See id.
73. 897 F. Supp. 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
74. See id. at 720.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 721-24. The court declined to determine whether New York or Rhode Island
law governed, finding that the result under either would be the same. See id. at 722. The plaintiff had argued, unsuccessfully, that federal law should apply because patents are created and
governed by federal law. See id. at 720-21. This is an interesting argument, as the plaintiff had
initially filed the suit in a state court, and it was the defendant who removed the suit to federal
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ruling was probably correct. Federal courts sitting in diversity cases
must apply the substantive statutory and case law of the forum state.78
If the law of the forum state is unclear, a federal court must predict
how the highest court of that state would resolve the issue.79 It is very
unlikely that either the Rhode Island Supreme Court or the New
York Court of Appeals would have awarded the fees sought by
KMK.80 Rhode Island statutory law is silent on the issue and the
Rhode Island Supreme Court has consistently found that costs will
not be awarded unless authorized by a statute or contract.81 New
York permits recovery where “the action on behalf of the corporation was successful, in whole or in part, or if anything was received by
the . . . claimant . . . as the result of a judgment, compromise or settlement of an action or claim.”82 The issue for the courts is whether
making a demand without filing a lawsuit constitutes an “action” under that statute.83 In 1962, a New York court held that it does not: “It
would be unwise to authorize compensation to counsel for a stockholder whenever management took action beneficial to the corporation as a result of a request or demand by a stockholder.”84
Unlike the court in Foley, the Hasbro court offered policy arguments to support the position that fee recovery should not be allowed
when no suit has been filed.85 The court argued that if there were no
filing requirement, “shareholders could bring frivolous lawsuits
merely to accrue attorneys’ fees or to force the company to enter into
clandestine settlements,”86 and concluded that “allowing shareholders
to recover attorneys’ fees for making a demand would defeat the

court. See id. at 720 n.1. State courts do not have jurisdiction over cases arising under the federal patent laws. See id. at 721.
78. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938).
79. See id.; see also Travelers Ins. Co. v. 633 Third Assocs., 14 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 1994)
(stating that the court would rule based upon a prediction of how the New York Court of Appeals would resolve the issues).
80. See Hasbro, 897 F. Supp. at 722-24.
81. See id. (citing Eleazer v. Ted Reed Thermal, Inc., 576 A.2d 1217, 1221 (R.I. 1990);
Newport Yacht Management, Inc. v. Clark, 567 A.2d 364, 366-67 (R.I. 1989)). Rhode Island
does not even allow fee recovery for plaintiffs in derivative suits. See id. at 722.
82. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 626(e) (McKinney 1986).
83. See Hasbro, 897 F. Supp. at 723.
84. Ripley v. International Rys., 227 N.Y.S.2d 64, 68 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962), aff’d, 187
N.E.2d 131 (N.Y. 1962).
85. See Hasbro, 897 F. Supp. at 723-24.
86. Id. at 724 (citing Gordon v. Elliman, 119 N.E.2d 331, 346 (N.Y. 1954); Shapiro v.
Magaziner, 210 A.2d 890, 894 (Pa. 1965)).
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purpose of the [demand] requirement.”87
The court’s concerns, however, are misplaced. If recovery were
based on the plaintiffs’ ability to prove that the corporation benefited
from the action, frivolous lawsuits or demands would not increase,
because frivolous demands, by definition, do not confer a benefit on
the corporation. Furthermore, allowing a shareholder to recover his
expenses when he has conferred a benefit on the corporation would
strengthen, not defeat the demand requirement. Under the system
defended by the court, a shareholder or shareholder’s attorney has an
incentive to share as little information as possible when he makes his
demand because he can only recover his legal fees if the corporation
does not meet his demand and he is able to file a lawsuit. If recovery
was based upon whether a benefit was conferred rather than upon
the technical status of the shareholder’s claim, the shareholder would
have greater incentive to fully inform the corporation at the demand
stage and less incentive to go to court.
B. Bird v. Lida, Inc.
A somewhat different result was reached when a Delaware judge
interpreted Delaware law in Bird v. Lida, Inc.88 In Lida, Chancellor
Allen found that a shareholder who confers a benefit on a corporation without filing suit can sometimes be awarded attorneys’ fees.
Allen acknowledged the Delaware Supreme Court’s statement that
fee-shifting should occur only if “the claim was meritorious when
filed,”89 but argued that to rely on the phrase “when filed” would be
to engage in “stunted literalism.”90 Allen chose instead to emphasize
the word “meritorious,” stating that “[t]he ‘when filed’ restriction is
intended, I suppose, to preclude fee awards in cases that do not have
‘merit’ . . . when filed, even if discovery later shows the existence of a
litigable and settleable case. Thus the ‘when filed’ term means to discourage derivative suits brought as a ‘fishing expedition.’”91 Allen
concluded that this purpose was irrelevant to the issue in Lida.92
After determining that Tandycrafts did not preclude an award to

87. Id.
88. 681 A.2d 399 (Del. Ch. 1996). For a discussion of the facts of Lida, see supra notes 2-8
and accompanying text.
89. Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162, 1167 (Del. 1989).
90. Lida, 681 A.2d at 404-05.
91. Id. at 405.
92. See id.
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James Bird of his legal expenses, Chancellor Allen turned to Kauf93
man v. Shoenberg, a 1952 Court of Chancery case. In Kaufman,
then-Chancellor Seitz94 held that “a stockholder is entitled to his reasonable investigation fees if his demand produces some real benefit
to the Corporation without the necessity for litigation.”95 Although
Kaufman was not direct precedent because in that case a suit had
been filed,96 Chancellor Allen found this factual distinction to be irrelevant. He held that Kaufman required him to recognize a shareholder’s right to recover investigation fees including attorney’s fees,
in connection with the making of a demand pursuant to Delaware
Chancery Court Rule 23.197 under certain circumstances.98 Allen buttressed his legal conclusion with policy arguments99 concluding,
among other things, that Bird’s demand, which led to a nearly
$700,000 gain for the collective shareholders, appeared to be “the
sort of activity that rational shareholders would encourage and would
agree to reimburse [if] they had the relevant information ex ante.”100
Chancellor Allen’s “economic analysis” led him to recognize “a
powerful argument in favor of” reimbursement of expenses by a
shareholder whose “meritorious” demand has led to a quantifiable
benefit for the corporation.101 Nevertheless, James Bird did not prevail. Theory and practice convinced Allen to reject one arbitrary
technical rule: that the presence or absence of a filed suit would de-

93. 92 A.2d 295 (Del. Ch. 1952).
94. Collins Seitz later served as Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit.
95. Kaufman, 92 A.2d at 295.
96. See id. As in Tandycrafts, the suit in Kaufman was dismissed before the litigation
could be completed. See id. For further discussion of the facts of Kaufman, see Kaufman v.
Shoenberg, 91 A.2d 786, 788-90, 793-94 (Del. Ch. 1952) (holding that in a shareholder action to
enjoin a corporation from implementing a stock option plan for key employees, the agreement
of employees, to whom options were given, that they would remain in employment for two
years constituted legal consideration for the grant of the options).
97. For a discussion of the importance of Rule 23.1, see supra note 65 and accompanying
text.
98. See Bird v. Lida, Inc., 681 A.2d 399, 405 (Del. Ch. 1996). Those circumstances are:
at least (1) the presentation of a meritorious corporate claim by a shareholder, (2)
the expenditure of funds or credit by the shareholder in investigating such claim, (3)
action by the board that confers a quantifiable financial benefit on the corporation,
(4) which action is causally related to the making of the shareholder demand.
Id.
99. See Lida, 681 A.2d at 402-05 (arguing that awarding fees in this context would reward
behavior that is beneficial to shareholders without encouraging “frivolous” demands).
100. Id. at 403.
101. Id.
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termine whether a shareholder could recover his costs.102 However,
refusing to allow economic analysis to take him too far from traditional legal analysis,103 Allen instituted another arbitrary technical
rule: that a shareholder can only recover costs if he makes a
“meritorious” corporate claim in the Rule 23.1 demand.104 To be indemnified for his costs under Chancellor Allen’s rule, James Bird’s
demand would have to “involve not simply a claim of business suboptimization, but a ‘meritorious’ claim of legal (including equitable)
wrong.”105 Under Delaware law, a claim is only meritorious if the
plaintiff can prove facts that give him a reasonable chance of prevailing at trial.106 If the court is convinced that the shareholder presenting the demand would not have been able to compel the corporation to capitulate to the demand in a lawsuit, the shareholder cannot
recover expenses, regardless of the economic benefit his actions may
have conferred upon the corporation.
Chancellor Allen found that if James Bird’s demand had been
disregarded by Lida and Bird had filed a lawsuit, his suit would not
have been meritorious because the “unreasonable” leases of which
Bird complained were entered into before Bird or any other public
shareholder acquired stock.107 No public shareholder had actually
been wronged by the leases,108 because the market price of the stock
when the public shareholders bought it reflected the unfair leases.109
Thus, the $680,000 gained by the corporation as a result of Bird’s
demand were windfall profits to the shareholders. It is ironic that if

102. See id. at 404-05.
103. See id. Allen reasoned:
The law comprises more than the determination of contested facts and the unmediated application of principles of economic efficiency . . . . While notions of economic
efficiency will appropriately play a role in the myriad instances in which common-law
courts shape the law interstially [sic], case by case, courts do tend to look . . . to concerns more directly affecting legal values. Thus, courts are primarily concerned with
legal values such as procedural fairness; fidelity to authoritative pronouncements of
substantive law; the application of a professionally defined canon of construction
techniques to produce legal meanings; and the acceptance of an established hierarchy of authority. . . . [I]t is not satisfactory for a court to begin and end its analysis of
a legal problem with . . . economic analysis . . . .
Id. at 403.
104. See id. at 405-06.
105. Id. at 406.
106. See Chrysler Corp. v. Dann, 223 A.2d 384, 387 (Del. 1966).
107. See Lida, 681 A.2d at 406.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 406 n.4 (“[T]he market priced what the buyer was buying, warts and all. It
would be neither fair nor efficient to permit later complaints about a disclosed wart.”).
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the shareholders had been entitled to the $680,000,110 they would have
had to pay Bird’s expenses. However, because they were not legally
entitled to the $680,000, they received it for free. Under the rule of
Bird v. Lida, Inc., shareholders must pay for what they are entitled
to, but they do not have to pay for undeserved gains.
As Chancellor Allen seems to realize, economic analysis does
not justify this distinction.111 However, Allen balanced economic efficiency against “certain legal institutional concerns.”112 He argued
that awarding fees for a “meritorious” demand was only a “small
step” from fee-shifting in litigation, and one that was required by
Kaufman, while awarding fees for a nonmeritorious demand that
confers the same benefit upon the corporation was a “larger step.”113
While Allen conceded that this “larger step” “would certainly be rational,” he concluded that it was not sufficiently “supported by existing legal authorities to warrant judicial adoption at this time.”114
It is not clear how Chancellor Allen can read Kaufman as compelling precedent for his “small step,” but not for the “larger step.”
Chancellor Seitz did not address the issue of “merit” in his eight sentence opinion in Kaufman. To Seitz, the issue was “whether, as a
matter of law, a stockholder is entitled to his reasonable investigation
fees if his demand produces some real benefit to the Corporation
without the necessity for litigation.”115 Seitz held that a stockholder is
entitled to such fees if he can prove that his demand produced a
benefit for the corporation.116 Seitz extended recovery in this way because, “substantially the same benefit accrues to the Corporation
whether it be as the result of the demand or of successful litiga-

110. That is, had they been wrongfully deprived of the money by the directors and then gotten it as the result of a “meritorious” demand.
111. See Lida, 681 A.2d at 407. Specifically, Chancellor Allen stated:
[I]f we appreciate the collective action problem of shareholders and the neat solution
to the collective action problem that paying a bounty to successful shareholders[’]
lawyers represents, why should the law care whether Mr. Bird conferred a benefit
through a meritorious legal claim or through stimulating the board simply to act in a
way he correctly thought was advantageous? In either event the collective action
problem of shareholders was overcome and a substantial financial benefit was
realized by the corporate collectivity.
Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Kaufman v. Shoenberg, 92 A.2d 295, 295 (Del. Ch. 1952).
116. See id.
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tion.”117 Since Bird and his attorney produced a “real benefit” of over
$680,000 for the corporation, the logic, as well as the language, of
Kaufman would seem to counsel in favor of recovery for James Bird.
III. PROPOSALS
In our adversarial system, attorneys are expected to be loyal advocates, zealously carrying out their clients’ wishes.118 Plaintiffs’ attorneys in shareholder suits, however, do not fulfill this role.119 In
shareholder litigation, the attorney usually represents all the shareholders of a given corporation (class action) or the corporation itself
(derivative suit).120 In such cases, the attorney is almost always the
driving force behind the litigation.121 The attorney is an entrepreneur,
seeking opportunities to increase his personal wealth.122 He will generally find a promising suit first and then look for a “client” to allow
him to bring the suit.123 Once the suit has commenced, the attorney
remains the decisionmaker, with the client serving as a mere figurehead.124 The decisions made by the entrepreneur-attorney, both be117. Id.
118. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1992) (“A lawyer shall
abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation . . . and shall consult
with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter.”); Coffee, supra note 44, at
677.
119. See Macey & Miller, supra note 22, at 3.
120. See id. at 9-11. There are some cases where an attorney represents a single plaintiff in
a shareholder suit. See, e.g., Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162, 1163 (Del.
1989) (recognizing as the plaintiff a corporation that was the largest single stockholder in the
defendant corporation).
121. See Macey & Miller, supra note 22, at 7-8 (noting that plaintiffs’ attorneys in shareholder suits “are not subject to monitoring by their putative clients, [and thus] they operate
largely according to their own self-interest”); Coffee, supra note 44, at 677-79 (discussing evidence that class actions and derivative suits are generally attorney-motivated).
122. See Macey & Miller, supra note 22, at 3.
123. See Coffee, supra note 44, at 679 (describing the plaintiffs’ attorney as a “bounty
hunter” who is “motivated to prosecute legal violations still unknown to prospective clients”).
Both class action and derivative suits require nominal plaintiffs, see Macey & Miller, supra note
22, at 5; however, “identifying and securing a nominal plaintiff is often only a necessary procedural step that seldom poses a substantial barrier,” Coffee, supra note 44, at 682.
124. See Macey & Miller, supra note 22, at 5; see also Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112,
1144 (11th Cir. 1985) (reprimanding the plaintiffs’ attorneys for not serving the interests of all
their clients); Foster v. Boise-Cascade, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 674, 681, 695 (S.D. Tex. 1976)
(recognizing the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ incentive to settle a case when settlement is not necessarily in the best interests of the clients and rejecting the attorneys’ fee of $12,000, arrived at in a
settlement with the defendant-corporation, as unreasonable), aff’d, 577 F.2d 335 (5th Cir.
1978).
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fore and after the suit has been filed, reflect the attorney’s own interests and not those of the client.125 Because the plaintiffs’ attorney
controls the litigation, it is necessary to align the incentives of plaintiffs’ attorneys with those of general wealth maximization.126
A. Recovery for a Benefit Conferred
1. A New Question for Courts. The question that should be asked in fee recovery cases is: “Was a benefit conferred upon the
corporation as a result of costs borne by the shareholder and his
attorney?” If the answer is “yes,” then the corporation should be
required to compensate the shareholder for his costs, including legal
fees.127 Courts should be directed to focus on economic solutions such
125. See Macey & Miller, supra note 22, at 4 (stating that “the plaintiff’s attorney—not the
client—controls the litigation”).
126. See id. at 3-4.
127. Fee recovery should be granted only if the benefit to the corporation exceeds the fees
generated by the shareholder. If the fees are greater than the benefits, the action was not efficient, and should not be rewarded or encouraged. While this point may seem obvious, at least
one court, acting in a class action setting, has allowed plaintiffs’ attorneys to collect fees far in
excess of the benefit that they created. In Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., Judge Frank
Easterbrook discussed a class action suit in which an Alabama state court had allowed a settlement that granted the plaintiff’s attorneys more money than was recovered from the defendants:
A class action contending that the Bank of Boston and its affiliates (collectively, the
Bank) did not promptly post interest to real estate escrow accounts was filed in Alabama by a Chicago law firm. Settlement ensued, and the class members learned only
what the notice told them. Few opted out or objected, because the maximum award
to any class member was less than $9. Any recovery, however small, seemed preferable to initiating a separate suit or even bearing the costs of protesting the settlement’s terms. After the state judge approved the pact, the Bank carried out its part:
it disbursed more than $8 million to the class attorneys in legal fees and credited
most accounts with paltry sums. Problem: the [legal] fees, equal to 5.32 percent of
the balance in each account, were debited to the accounts. For many accounts the
debit exceeded the credit. Dexter J. Kamilewicz, for example, received a credit of
$2.19 and a debit of $91.33, for a loss of $89.14.
100 F.3d 1348, 1349 (7th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted) (denying a petition for a rehearing en
banc of Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996)) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to set aside this
result because it found that it did not have jurisdiction. See Kamilewicz, 92 F.3d at 509. This
was because federal courts, other than the Supreme Court, do not have jurisdiction to review
decisions of state courts. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,
476 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923); Hoover v. Wagner, 47 F.3d
845, 849 (7th Cir. 1995).
While the outcome of Kamilewicz is unjust, such an outcome in the derivative suit or
shareholder demand context would be even more egregious because, unlike in the class action
context, there would be no right to “opt out.” For further discussion of questionable settlements of shareholder suits, see Brandi, supra note 10, at 392 (stating that “courts quite often
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as giving shareholders and attorneys the incentive to solve the
collective action problem, rather than technicalities such as whether a
suit was classified as a derivative or individual suit,128 whether a suit
was filed or merely threatened,129 or whether the benefit resulted
from “righting a wrong” or simply increasing efficiency.130 If a
shareholder can prove that his action, which entailed costs such as
attorneys’ fees, created a benefit for the corporation, then he should
be indemnified by the corporation.
This would place a two-part burden of proof on the shareholder
and his attorney. First, they would have to prove the existence of a
benefit to the corporation. Second, they would have to prove that
their actions caused that benefit. Placing this burden of proof on the
shareholder is a departure from the present law governing feeshifting after a derivative suit is filed. Under current law, “[o]nce it is
determined that action benefiting the corporation chronologically
followed the filing of a meritorious suit, the burden is upon the corporation to demonstrate ‘that the lawsuit did not in any way cause [its]
action.’”131 However, placing the burden on the corporation to prove
that the corporate benefit did not result from the demand might encourage plaintiffs’ attorneys to demand that a corporation undertake
an action the corporation had already planned to take in the hope
that the corporation would not be able to prove its prior intention.
Furthermore, in light of the fact that the Delaware Supreme Court
has held that noneconomic benefits, such as changes in corporate
policy or increased corporate disclosure, can justify an award of attorneys’ fees,132 it would be virtually impossible, in many cases, for a
corporation to prove that a specific noneconomic change did not confer a benefit on the corporation. This would result in shareholders
being rewarded for actions that created change but did not actually
benefit the corporation,133 and were thus not efficient actions. Placing
approve settlements that involve only cosmetic procedural relief for the shareholders but at the
same time grant high attorney fees” (footnote omitted)); Romano, supra note 10, at 84; John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 5, 26-33.
128. See supra notes 45-61 and accompanying text.
129. See supra Part II.
130. See supra notes 101-17 and accompanying text.
131. Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162, 1165 (Del. 1989) (quoting Allied
Artists Picture Corp. v. Baron, 413 A.2d 876, 880 (Del. 1980)) (emphasis added).
132. See id. at 1164-65; see also Chrysler Corp. v. Dann, 223 A.2d 384, 386 (Del. 1966).
133. One quarter of shareholder settlements result in structural relief. See Romano, supra
note 10, at 84. In most of these cases, the changes are merely cosmetic. See id. It seems likely
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the burden of proof on the shareholder is consistent with the general
common law tradition that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof in
civil suits. Furthermore, it is consistent with Chancellor Seitz’s
holding that a shareholder is entitled to recover costs only “if he is
able to substantiate his contention factually.”134
2. The Business Judgment Rule. The business judgment rule
might be perceived as an obstacle to the expansion of recovery for
shareholders who confer a benefit upon the corporation, but it is not.
The business judgment rule “is a presumption that in making a
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed
basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was
in the best interests of the company.”135 Under the business judgment
rule, courts will defer to business decisions made by disinterested
directors unless the plaintiff can prove an abuse of discretion by the
directors.136 In Delaware, courts require a showing of “gross negligence” before they will conclude that the directors abused their
discretion.137
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recover, regardless of how much benefit would have accrued to the
corporation if the board had accepted the demand. Directors would
be under a fiduciary duty to accept the demand if they believed that it
was in the best interests of the corporation,138 but they would be free
to use their business judgment and reject any demand that they found
was not in the corporation’s best interest. The shareholder could
then proceed with a derivative or individual suit and recover his fees
if the suit was successful. This is unchanged from current law.139
B. Striking Back at Strike Suits
1. The English Solution: Making the Loser Pay. The proposal
put forth in Part III.A.1 would give an incentive to plaintiffs’
attorneys to act in an efficient, wealth-maximizing way. However,
there is an equally important need for a disincentive to deter these
attorneys from acting in wealth-destroying ways. Attorneys act
destructively when they bring “strike suits”140—shareholder suits
which would not win in court on their merits, and which have no
potential to benefit the corporation—for the purpose of inducing the
corporation to settle in order to avoid the costs and disruptions of
litigation. Unfortunately, the strike suit is a common occurrence.141
Although strike suits are meritless,142 corporations and their officers
138. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993) (noting that “[i]n
exercising [their] powers, directors are charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to protect the
interests of the corporation and to act in the best interests of its shareholders”); see also Alabama By-Products Corp. v. Cede & Co., 657 A.2d 254, 265 (Del. 1995) (“[A]ny exercise of . . .
managerial power is tempered by the fiduciary duties which directors owe to the corporation
and its shareholders.”).
139. See supra Part I.B.
140. “The term ‘strike suit,’ coined in the 1930s, refers to a derivative action whose nuisance value gives it a settlement value independent of its merits.” Brandi, supra note 10, at 357
n.1 (citing Note, Extortionate Corporate Litigation: The Strike Suit, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1308
(1934)).
141. See id. at 369 (noting that “powerful incentives seem to exist to bring nonmeritorious
actions for their nuisance and settlement value”) (citing PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 589 (Proposed Final Draft 1992)); see
generally Coffee, supra note 44, at 677-84 (exploring the monetary incentives which may encourage plaintiffs’ attorneys to overpursue derivative actions); Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the
Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 534-45
(1991).
142. It should be noted that “meritless” as it is used in this Note is different from
“frivolous.” “A claim or defense is frivolous if a proponent can present no rational argument
based upon the evidence or law in support of that claim or defense.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 668 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Liebowitz v. Aimexco Inc., 701 P.2d 140, 142 (Colo. Ct.
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have powerful incentives to settle them. The corporation must bear
the litigation expenses to fight the suit, and, perhaps more
significantly, the existence of a pending lawsuit may have a substantial deleterious effect on the defendant’s normal business activity.143
These incentives to settle make meritless strike suits profitable for
attorneys.
The proper disincentive for these meritless suits is to require a
plaintiff who loses on the merits to reimburse the defendant for a
portion of its litigation expenses. 144 This rule is fair because a shareholder who files a meritless lawsuit unilaterally thrusts costs upon the
corporation and its shareholders. This rule is efficient because it
would encourage corporations to fight meritless lawsuits rather than
settle them, providing a powerful deterrent to these destructive suits.
Finally, this rule is necessary because other attempts to deter frivolous shareholder litigation, such as the contemporaneous ownership
rule145 and security-for-expense statutes,146 are inadequate; those feeshifting provisions are not related to the merits of the case and thus
App. 1985)). In this Note, a suit is “without merit” or “meritless” if, after the completion of
legal proceedings, including any appeals, the plaintiff has lost. It is entirely possible that a
plaintiff could have rational arguments for his position (thus making his claim nonfrivolous) but
still lose (thus making his claim meritless), as the defendant may have stronger rational arguments for its position.
143. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740 (1975). Part of the disruption of normal business activity stems from “[t]he prospect of extensive deposition of the
defendant’s officers and associates and the concomitant opportunity for extensive discovery of
business documents.” Id. at 741. The Blue Chip opinion “discusses particularly the merits and
dangers of class [action shareholder suits]. However, [the Court’s] considerations are equally
valid for derivative suits.” Brandi, supra note 10, at 370 n.77; see also EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supra note 17, at 106 (stating that the real costs of a derivative suit include “the opportunity costs of the managers’ time devoted to defense”); Alexander, supra note 141, at 571
(stating that pending litigation may distract the efforts of employees who participate in the litigation, harm the company’s reputation, limit the company’s ability to obtain additional financing, and curtail business options, such as mergers or acquisitions).
144. It is unlikely that the court could order relief that would entirely offset the costs of the
litigation. As difficult as it is to assess the value of legal services rendered, it is plausible that a
court could do so. However, it would be virtually impossible to put a dollar value on wasted
time of corporate employees, disruption in business, or business documents released in the discovery process.
145. “The contemporaneous ownership rule, as it exists in the majority of jurisdictions, requires either that the derivative suit plaintiff was a shareholder at the time of the transaction
which is the subject of the complaint or that the plaintiff thereafter obtained the shares by operation of law.” Brandi, supra note 10, at 372 (citing ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE
LAW 650 (1986)).
146. “Security-for-expenses statutes, which exist in about one-third of the states, give corporate defendants the right to demand that the shareholder-plaintiff post security for the payment of defendants’ reasonable litigation expenses before filing suit.” Id. (footnotes omitted).
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affect meritorious as well as nonmeritorious suits.147
2. The “American Rule.” A potential hurdle for the proposal put
forth in Part III.B.1 of this Note is the “American rule” on feeshifting. While the majority of the world’s industrialized democracies
require lawsuit losers to pay some or all of the winners’ attorneys’
fees, the rule in the United States continues to be that each party is
responsible for its own fees.148 The American rule has been riddled
with legislatively created exceptions at both the state and federal
level.149 Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court indicated in
150
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. The Wilderness Society that the
American rule continues to be the general rule in the United States.151
However, this affirmation of the American rule may not be as rigid as
it first appears; in Alyeska, the Court simply stated that lower courts
should follow the rule in the absence of statutory direction. The
court made it clear that it was not taking any position on whether the
American rule was good policy.152 Alyeska is an exercise in judicial
restraint153 rather than an endorsement of the merits of the American
147. See id.
148. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 651.
149. See id. Examples at the federal level include the following: Amendments to Freedom
of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1994); Packers and Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C. § 210(f)
(1994); Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 7 U.S.C. § 499g(b) (1994); Bankruptcy Act,
11 U.S.C. §§ 330(a)(1), 503(b)(4) (1994); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994); Unfair Competition Act, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1994); Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1994); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77www(a) (1994); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§
78i(e), 78r(a) (1994); Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (1994); 17 U.S.C.
§ 116 (copyrights); Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994); Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 107(e) (1994); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §
216(b) (1994); Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 928
(1994); Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1994); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(4) (1994); 35 U.S.C. § 285
(relating to patent infringement); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1994) (relating to clean air standards);
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1994), and § 706(k), 78 Stat. 261 (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b), 2000e-5(k) (1994)); Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4911(d)
(1994); Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 206 (1994); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a), (c).
150. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
151. See id. at 271.
152. See id. at 270 (“We do not purport to assess the merits or demerits of the ‘American
Rule’ with respect to the allowance of attorneys’ fees.”).
153. See id. at 271 (“[I]t is not for us to invade the legislature’s province by redistributing
litigation costs . . . .”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 310 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (discussing the “superiority” of the legislature over the judiciary); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465-66 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (discussing
the founders’ view of the judiciary as “beyond comparison the weakest of the three depart-
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rule, and the decision leaves to Congress at the federal level, and by
analogy, to state legislatures at the state level,154 the prerogative to
reverse the American rule completely, or to enact further exceptions
where there is reason to do so.
There have been many appeals to reverse the American rule in
its entirety.155 However, the proposal put forth in this Note would
ments of power . . . .”); David Luban, Justice Holmes and the Metaphysics of Judicial Restraint,
44 DUKE L.J. 449, 450 (1994) (“It is a platitude of our political culture that judicial self-restraint
should likewise be numbered among the judicial virtues, alongside incorruptibility, disinterest,
fairness, and wisdom.”).
154. Alyeska constrains only federal courts. See 421 U.S. at 269. However, many state high
courts have issued similar opinions stating that the American rule is the rule for courts to follow absent statutory instruction. See, e.g., Eleazer v. Ted Reed Thermal, Inc., 576 A.2d 1217,
1221 (R.I. 1990) (“[T]he right to collect attorney’s fees did not exist at common law and . . .
consequently such fees may be taxed only when there is . . . specific statutory authority . . . .”);
Jackson v. Town of Searsport, 456 A.2d 852, 855 (Me. 1983) (“In our state, as elsewhere in this
country, the ‘American Rule’ for attorney’s fees is followed: each party pays the costs of his
own lawyers.”); Hamer v. Kirk, 356 N.E.2d 524, 528 (Ill. 1976) (citing with approval the holding
of Alyeska). The rule in Delaware is actually slightly more lenient than the federal rule. The
American rule applies generally in Delaware, but fee-shifting is allowed if there is an applicable statute or a court-created “equity doctrine.” Goodrich v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 681
A.2d 1039, 1043-44 (Del. 1996); see also Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162,
1166 (Del. 1989) (discussing the “common benefit exception” which allows courts to use their
equity powers to shift attorneys’ fees).
155. See Rowe, supra note 148, at 651 (“In recent decades, the American rule of no attorney fee shifting has come under increasing questioning and criticism.”). For recent examples of
criticism of the American rule, see PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA
FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN AMERICA 24 (1991) (“The ‘loser pays’ rule (sometimes called
the English Rule) is grounded in fairness—in the equitable principle that a party who suffers
should be made whole. Where the rule operates, it also prompts more realistic case evaluations.”); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, An Analysis of Fee Shifting Based on the
Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits, and the Role of Rule 11, 25 J. LEGAL
STUD. 371, 371 (1996) (noting that the American rule “does not induce optimal litigation decisions”); Gregory A. Hicks, Statutory Damage Caps Are an Incomplete Reform: A Proposal for
Attorney Fee Shifting in Tort Actions, 49 LA. L. REV. 763, 793 (1989) (arguing that a
“prevailing plaintiff fee shifting system” would, more than the American rule, “encourage the
bringing of strong claims”); Gregory E. Maggs & Michael D. Weiss, Progress on Attorney’s
Fees: Expanding the “Loser Pays” Rule in Texas, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1915, 1915-37 (1994)
(arguing that a loser pays rule is preferable to the American rule: “A loser pays rule . . . would
benefit the legal system as a whole in two ways. First, it would reduce the tendency of attorney’s fees to thwart the substantive goals of [the law]. Second, it would encourage meritorious
lawsuits while discouraging frivolous ones.”); Keith N. Hylton, Fee Shifting and Incentives to
Comply with the Law, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1069, 1120-21 (1993) (contending that the American
rule was the “unintended byproduct of mercantilist interests” and that a rule that shifts fees in
favor of prevailing plaintiffs promotes both compliance with legal rules and the settlement of
disputes); Lorraine Wright Feuerstein, Comment, Two-Way Fee Shifting on Summary Judgment or Dismissal: An Equitable Deterrent to Unmeritorious Lawsuits, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 125,
128 (1995) (“The American rule provides no deterrent to groundless litigation. In fact it invites
spurious claims.”) (citing further scholarly criticism of the American rule); Bradley L. Smith,
Note, Three Attorney Fee-Shifting Rules and Contingency Fees: Their Impact on Settlement In-
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simply add to the many legislative exceptions to the rule. Such an exception is warranted by the fact that securities suits in general, and
derivative suits in particular, are the subjects of particular abuse by
plaintiffs’ attorneys.156 There are two additional reasons why the case
for a “loser pays” rule157 is stronger in the derivative suit context than
in other civil suits. First, unlike in most civil suits, under existing law,
the shareholder-plaintiff in a derivative suit can force the corporation
to pay his legal fees if he wins or favorably settles his suit.158 Requiring plaintiffs in suits which destroy rather than create corporate value
(i.e., suits in which the corporation expends economic resources defending the suit, but where the plaintiff’s claim turns out to be without merit) to pay the corporation’s legal fees would level the playing
field between plaintiffs and defendants.
Second, the argument most often advanced against a “loser
pays” rule is particularly weak in the derivative suit context. This argument goes as follows: A “good faith” plaintiff would run the risk of
being financially punished for advancing what he believed to be a legitimate claim that turns out to be meritless. This risk, it is argued,
would scare potential plaintiffs and chill meritorious lawsuits.159
However, since shareholder suits are generally brought by “entrepreneur” attorneys, with clients acting as mere figureheads, attorneys
generally advance the litigation expenses, receiving reimbursement,
including a fee, only if they are successful.160 The risk of having to
remunerate a victorious defendant would be an additional cost that
the entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ attorney could and would bear in order
to get potentially profitable cases. The attorney would still bring
cases that have strong probabilities of success, because even if there
were an occasional loss, the attorney could cover the costs with his
gains from his victorious efforts. However, the plaintiffs’ attorney
would be much less likely to bring meritless claims in the hope of setcentives, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2154, 2186 (1992) (concluding that the American rule, when compared with other possible fee-shifting rules, is “least conducive to settlement”).
156. See supra notes 9-11, 140-43 and accompanying text.
157. The “loser pays” rule is sometimes referred to as the “English rule” because it has
been the rule in England for centuries. See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 247. The rule was imposed
there by statute. See id.
158. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
159. For statements of this argument, see Lee Goldman, The World’s Best Article on Competitor Suits for False Advertising, 45 FLA. L. REV. 487, 515 (1993); Avery Katz, The Effect of
Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation, 10 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 26 (1990);
Smith, supra note 155, at 2155.
160. See Coffee, supra note 44, at 678.
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tlement, as these would be likely to result in large losses for the attorney.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs’ attorneys in shareholder litigation serve an important
role in deterring and punishing certain types of inefficient action by
corporate managers and directors. The derivative suit facilitates this
role, allowing successful attorneys to recover fees from the corporation, and thus providing the necessary incentive for attorneys to police corporate inefficiency. However, current law in this area is both
under- and over-inclusive. In certain situations, attorneys and shareholders are not compensated or rewarded for wealth-creating activity,161 and thus that beneficial activity is not encouraged; in other
situations attorneys are rewarded for wealth-destroying actions,162 encouraging this detrimental activity. This Note provides two proposals
that would alleviate these problems. The collective action problem,
which hinders shareholder oversight of management, can be overcome by allowing shareholders who confer a benefit on the corporation to recover their attorneys’ fees from the corporation. This would
encourage future James Birds and their attorneys to add value to the
economy. Similarly, the “strike suit” problem, through which unscrupulous shareholders and attorneys cause harm to the corporation,
could be greatly reduced by requiring the shareholder-plaintiff to pay
the corporation for the unnecessary legal costs he caused it to incur.
One hundred years after Oliver Wendell Holmes predicted that
the “man of the future” would be “the master of economics,”163 economic analysis plays an increasingly large role in the formulation of
American law and public policy.164 As Chancellor Allen demon161. See, e.g., Kaufman Malchman & Kirby, P.C. v. Hasbro, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 719, 722-24
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that a law firm that represented a shareholder who had successfully
demanded that a toy manufacturer stop paying license fees on expired patents without instituting litigation was not entitled to recover attorney fees under Rhode Island or New York
law); Lida, 681 A.2d at 407 (holding that a shareholder could not recover attorney’s fees, even
though his demand resulted in a benefit to the corporation); Foley v. Santa Fe Pac. Corp., 641
N.E.2d 992, 996 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
162. See supra notes 9-11, 140-43 and accompanying text.
163. HOLMES, supra note 1, reprinted in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE HOLMES,
supra note 1, at 399.
164. See POSNER, supra note 17, at 19 (noting the recent application of economics to all aspects of the legal system). Former Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork observed:
One of the most startling, and I think beneficial, developments in the law has been
the relatively recent spread of economic learning among judges (even more perhaps
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strated in Lida, however, economic analysis is not always determinative.165 This Note does not disagree with Allen’s assertion that the
law is and should be concerned with values other than economic efficiency.166 The values which concerned Chancellor Allen, “procedural
fairness; fidelity to authoritative pronouncements of substantive law;
[canons of construction]; and the acceptance of an established hierarchy of authority,”167 are certainly important. Other noneconomic values such as substantive fairness, democracy and the rule of law,
equality, and individual rights are even more important, and will often (properly) lead courts away from the most efficient outcome.
Additionally, it may be, as Chancellor Allen noted in Lida and the
United States Supreme Court noted in Alyeska, that the changes advocated by this Note would be better made by legislatures than
courts.168 Legislators should not be deterred from making new rules
that will increase economic efficiency simply because the old rules
are long-standing.

among their clerks), among professors in law schools, among practitioners . . . and in
many other segments of the policymaking and lawmaking world. . . . It’s the spread
of basic economic concepts and the awareness of economic ideas to noneconomists
that is so unexpected and so promising. One does not have to be a real economist to
benefit, because microeconomics is a field in which the simple ideas are the most
powerful ideas.
Robert H. Bork, The Role of the Courts in Applying Economics, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 21, 21-22
(1985).
165. See Bird v. Lida, Inc., 681 A.2d 399, 403 (Del. Ch. 1996).
166. See generally Bork, supra note 164, at 22 (arguing that people should not suffer under
“the delusion that all of the law’s problems can usefully be analyzed through economics”). But
cf. POSNER, supra note 17, at 3 (arguing that “economics is a powerful tool for analyzing a vast
range of legal questions”).
167. Lida, 681 A.2d at 403.
168. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S. 240, 271 (1975); Lida, 681
A.2d at 403.

